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Post-war Voters as Fiscal Liberals: 
Local Elections, Spending, and War Trauma in Contemporary Croatia 
This study exposes post-war voters’ fiscal liberalism using individual-level and aggregate-level data 
covering a decade and a half of local electoral competition in post-war Croatia. Aggregate-level 
analysis shows Croatian voters' fiscal liberalism to be conditional on their communities’ exposure to 
war violence: greater exposure to violence leads to greater support for fiscally expansionist 
incumbents. Individual-level analysis, on the other hand, shows post-war voters’ fiscal liberalism as 
rooted in their different levels of war-related trauma: more feelings of war-related trauma lead to 
greater economic expectations from the government. Our analysis also shows that voters’ war-
conditioned preferences for fiscally expansionist incumbents show little sign of abating over time – a 
testament to the challenge presented by post-war recovery, and to the impact war exerts on political 
life long after the bloodshed has ended. 
 
Public choice literature is divided when it comes to one important question: are voters fiscally liberal 
or fiscally conservative? In this study, we do not provide a comprehensive answer to this still 
unresolved puzzle which forms the foundation of a vast body of work in the political economy of 
voter choice. We do, however, offer a theoretically and empirically informed answer which we hold 
is valid in the context of post-war societies. We argue that individuals and communities exposed to 
war violence are fiscally liberal, as they seek economic security and fiscal activism from the 
government. Incumbents who provide that security, most notably in the form of fiscal expansion, get 
rewarded at the polls. In post-conflict contexts, this dynamic likely gets further compounded by the 
fact that war-affected communities also have greater needs for governmental intervention, with the 
challenges of reconstruction often out of reach of private initiatives. The consequences of this 
relationship between incumbents and voters in post-war polities could be toxic. In the environment 
of weak institutions and safeguards against corruption, a system which electorally rewards fiscal 
expansion could be particularly prone to clientelism. Post-war polities could be set down the path of 
political populism for years to come after the violence ends – a dynamic which has potentially 
dangerous repercussions not only for post-war economic recovery, but also for the health of post-
war democracy. 
 
This article offers a step toward improving our understanding of the political economy of elections 
and voter choice in post-war societies through the study of four cycles of local electoral competition 
in Croatia, the EU member state with the most recent experience of war on its soil. The 1991-1995 
Croatian war for independence may have had less media coverage compared with the war in 
neighbouring Bosnia-Herzegovina, but it had a tremendously destructive impact on Croatian society. 
Direct war damages were estimated at $50-80 billion, with an additional $22 billion of indirect 
damages in lost economic activity. More than one tenth of the housing stock was destroyed, and 
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nearly one fifth of the population – some 800,000 people – were displaced from their homes during 
the war. Official estimates of the number of dead stand at 13,583 and wounded at 37,180 on the 
Croatian side (Vlada, 1998), with comparable figures on the side of the Krajina Serbs at about half of 
those numbers. The legacy of war continues to be deeply felt by Croatian society to this day, with 
substantial areas of the country economically depressed, under land mines, or with highly deficient 
infrastructure. 
 
Our analysis is conducted on both the individual and aggregate levels and is based on two sets of 
sources. The individual-level analysis uses the data generated by the extensive 2003-2004 survey 
conducted under the auspices of the South-East European Social Survey Project (SEESSP) funded by 
the Research Council of Norway (Simkus, 2007). This project was particularly valuable because of its 
wealth of data on individuals’ war and post-war experiences. Our aggregate-level analysis is based 
on an original dataset we built on the level of more than five hundred Croatian municipalities for the 
period between 2002 and 2017. The dataset covers four cycles of local elections and includes a 
string of economic, demographic, and political data, as well as itemised components of municipal 
budgets. We also complement this extensive collection of post-war aggregate-level data with a set of 
variables capturing pre-war government spending and investment at the municipal level. We do this 
in an attempt to control for possible long-term factors affecting the relationship between 
incumbents’ electoral fortunes and their fiscal profligacy that are not necessarily related to the war. 
We focus our attention on electoral competition on the municipal level because local authorities 
have substantial powers when it comes to the provision of governmental services, particularly those 
associated with post-war reconstruction. What distinguishes the aggregate-level analysis in our 
study is not only the depth and breadth of our dataset, but also the fact that it covers electoral 
competition temporally removed from the immediate post-war period. All of this enables us to make 
more far-reaching conclusions about the impact of war violence and destruction on post-war 
political competition.  
 
The conclusions of the analysis clearly support our assertion that there is something qualitatively 
different about the electoral calculus of post-war voters. Our individual-level analysis convincingly 
demonstrates that the personal feelings of war-related trauma significantly affect voters’ political 
preferences. We show that voters experiencing war-related trauma exhibit a strong preference for 
an interventionist role of the government in the economy. Our argument is that voters experiencing 
war-related trauma turn to government to provide economic security. Furthermore, our aggregate-
level analysis shows how these individual-level dynamics translate into actual votes in the electoral 
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arena. First, we show that Croatian voters on the whole are fiscally liberal. They substantially reward 
incumbents for higher spending. More importantly, we also show that the level of fiscal liberalism is 
strongly conditioned by the level of population’s exposure to war violence. The electoral premium 
incumbents receive from voters for higher spending rises together with the increase in their 
municipality’s exposure to war violence, regardless of any pre-war patterns in economic 
development, government spending, or investments. Finally, our analysis shows that these voting 
trends exhibit little sign of abating over time, even two decades after the end of the war. This is a 
testament not only to the depth of challenge presented by post-war reconstruction and recovery, 
but also to the comprehensive – and thus far neglected – impact war continues to exert on social 
and political life long after the bloodshed has ended. 
 
Subnational elections and voters’ preferences: Fiscally liberal or conservative? 
Public choice literature has largely settled on a cynical interpretation of the relationship between 
office holders and voters. Classical studies in this body of work have established that politicians are 
office-seekers (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962) whose utility function is primarily concerned with 
maximising the probability of their re-election (Downs, 1957), followed by their inherent desire to 
extract rents from public budgets (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980; Ferejohn, 1986). It has furthermore 
been suggested that, in order to advance these goals, politicians use various categories of public 
spending with a specific desire to ‘buy votes,’ thus engaging in clientelism (Stokes et al., 2013). In 
local politics, lower transparency, and consequently lower accountability of public officials, has been 
shown to make clientelistic behaviour even more successful (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2005). The 
extensive literature on voter choice on the subnational level has been focused on several avenues 
through which local politicians misuse the budgets at their disposal to improve their re-election 
chances, but the most researched aspect of the whole story has been the effect of higher spending 
(and thus greater budget deficits) on local incumbents’ electoral chances. This is the area of the 
public choice literature which is largely still divided between two competing interpretations of the 
relationship between voters and policy makers. 
 
One could trace the origins of this division to Peltzman’s (1992) seminal study of presidential, 
senatorial, and gubernatorial elections in the United States, which initiated research on linking 
deficit spending to the probability of re-election. Peltzman’s famous finding that voters in the US 
behave as ‘fiscal conservatives’ implied that incumbents on both national and local levels get 
punished for pre-electoral increases in spending. This led Peltzman to conclude that deficit financing 
is electorally costly, but has left him unable to explain the vast growth of government spending (and 
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public debt) over the preceding four decades (Tanzi and Schuknecht, 2000). Peltzman’s conclusions 
have been re-examined in a number of different contexts with the literature divided regarding the 
portability of his findings. Brender (2003) confirmed Peltzman’s results for voters in Israel, where 
higher deficits and larger debts reduced the probability of re-election, while Lowry, Alt and Ferree 
(1998) found the same negative effect of budget deficits in US legislative elections. Using a panel of 
developed and established democracies, Brender and Drazen (2008) also confirmed that voters 
punished governments which ran high pre-electoral budget deficits. However, they failed to find a 
similar effect for less developed countries and younger democracies. 
 
On the other hand, a number of studies have suggested the opposite, namely that higher spending 
prior to elections increases incumbent electoral chances. Rosenberg (1992) for Israel; Akhmedov and 
Zhuravskaya (2004) for Russia; Sakurai and Menezes-Filho (2008) for Brazil; Jones, Meloni and 
Tommasi (2012) for Argentina; and Balaguer-Coll et al. (2015) for Spain all confirmed the existence 
of a local political business cycle where high-spending local officials have greater re-election 
probabilities. The crucial issue has also, however, been the type of spending. Drazen and Eslava 
(2010) looked at the composition of government spending in Colombian municipalities and found 
that voters positively respond to the pre-electoral increase in targeted spending on infrastructure. 
Veiga and Veiga (2007) and Baleiras and da Silva Costa (2004) also found evidence of an 
opportunistic political business cycle in Portugal, where specific types of government spending 
which the voters recognise as highly visible – usually infrastructural projects – increase electoral 
chances. Balaguer-Coll et al. (2015) reported very similar findings for Spanish local governments. 
Even in Peltzman’s (1992) seminal article, once investment in roads is included in his main 
explanatory variable, the total effect was weaker. Similarly, Brender (2003) found that voters do 
reward expenditures for development projects, despite punishing deficit spending. 
 
One possible solution to this debate has been provided by Jones, Meloni and Tommasi (2012) who 
compared the two conflicting findings – voters being fiscal conservatives versus fiscal liberals – and 
suggested that voter reactions to deficits and targeted spending depended primarily on the 
structure of their country’s fiscal federalism. The difference therefore could be institutional. In 
countries like Argentina, Brazil, or Russia local governments depend on financial flows from central 
governments. This is also the case in Croatia. Such an institutional setup could result in a 
detachment of local expenditures from local taxes, making voters unable to directly calculate the 
costs of services they receive. When voters believe the costs are passed on to someone else, they 
reward more public spending. On the other hand, in countries like the United States, fiscal 
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federalism implies much harder budget constraints for local governments, which are fully aware that 
voters will perceive any increase in local spending to be taken directly out of their pockets. This 
induces voters to demand more accountability and responsibility from their politicians, thus 
punishing any unnecessary pre-electoral increase in spending. Though the institutional explanation 
suggested by Jones, Meloni and Tommasi (2012) certainly has its appeal, it seems that even voters in 
institutional environments of fiscal federalism with hard budget constraints are not electorally 
immune to the allure of pork-barrel spending on lucrative infrastructure projects (Shepsle and 
Weingast, 1981; Bickers and Stein, 2000). 
 
The debate on whether voters are fiscally liberal or conservative, therefore, seems to still be 
inconclusive. Both camps in the literature on the political economy of local-level voter choice 
present compellingly elegant theoretical arguments and empirical evidence. Both, however, also 
suffer from substantial shortcomings and appear to be unable to account for conflicting 
observations. More importantly for our understanding of post-war political competition, they offer 
little guidance regarding possibly different dynamics at play in environments of post-conflict 
recovery. Unfortunately, the steadily expanding literature on elections and violent conflict also 
offers little help. Most efforts in this line of research have focused on the temporally proximate 
interrelationship of the two phenomena. What are the conditions under which elections lead to 
violent conflict or its relapse? Can violent conflict dynamics be transformed into democratic 
electoral competition? These are the types of questions which have garnered the most attention 
from researchers. Thus the literature on, for example, the potentially detrimental effects of poorly 
timed democratisation on societies mired by (latent) violent conflict is indeed substantial. Whereas 
our systematic understanding of the impact of war violence and destruction on the nature of post-
war electoral competition – save for some valuable case studies of individual post-conflict elections 
(e.g. Harris, 1999; Manning, 2001) or the impact of ethnic violence on post-war ethnic politics (e.g. 
Hadzic et al., 2017; Lupu and Peisakhin, 2017) – is very limited. 
 
Theoretical propositions: Exposure to war violence and voter choice 
Implicit in the classic political economy arguments regarding local-level voter choice is the 
understanding of voters’ preferences as uniform and fixed. The institutional arrangements may 
differ from polity to polity, but voters everywhere are assumed to be rational and self-interested. A 
growing body of work is showing, however, that preferences are not stable, uniform, fixed, or even 
rational. Voters make mistakes (Lupia and McCubbins 1998; Leigh 2009; Healy et al. 2010). They are 
cognitively and emotionally biased (Achen and Bartels 2013; Hill et al. 2012). They are often driven 
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by ultimately irrational heuristics like ideology or partisanship (Lau and Redlawsk 2001; Marsh and 
Tilley 2010; Tilley and Hobolt 2011). The conception of voters as retrospective evaluators of 
governmental performance with uniform processes of preference formation may be elegant, but it 
does not correspond to reality. Our understanding of how exposure to various forms of war violence 
fits into the reality of voter choice, however, is limited and fragmentary at best. These growing 
fragments of evidence, however, are beginning to demonstrate something of critical importance for 
our conceptions of post-war voter choice. They are suggesting that traumatic experiences and the 
way individuals deal with them can have a long-lasting impact on preferences and opinions when it 
comes to a host of political and economic issues. 
 
Research has shown, for example, that the psychologically traumatic experiences of the 9/11 
terrorist attacks shifted the affected individuals’ political preferences away from liberalism and 
toward conservatism (Bonanno and Jost, 2006). Scholars have also shown that exposure to terrorism 
in general can make individuals turn toward non-democratic attitudes (Canetti-Nisim et al., 2009) 
and lower their support for peace efforts (Hirsch-Hoefler et al., 2014). Exposure to violence – 
personal or familial – was furthermore shown to not only reduce trust (Cassar et al., 2011) and 
intensify ethnic identity (Rohner et al., 2013; Lupu and Peisakhin, 2017), but also to have some 
positive effects on individuals’ political behaviour such as participating in community meetings, 
being politically active, and voting (Bellows and Miguel, 2009; Blattman, 2009). There are strong 
indications that these effects seem to last long after the actual violence has ended (Rozenas et al., 
2017). Similarly, individuals’ experiences of traumatic economic hardship during their formative 
years have been shown to lead to lasting changes in a string of beliefs about the workings of the 
economy. People who grew up during recessions have been shown to be more likely to believe in 
the importance of luck for financial success and more inclined to distrust political institutions 
(Giuliano and Spilimbergo, 2009). In other words, virtually all aspects of individuals’ political lives – 
from participation to attitudes toward democracy – have been shown to be subject to the decisive 
influence of exposure to traumatic life experiences. 
 
Here it is particularly important to highlight the advances in our understanding of the impact of 
traumatic experiences on one fundamental aspect of individuals’ political and economic calculus, 
namely their risk aversion.  Save for a couple of exceptions (Eckel et al., 2009; Voors et al., 2012), the 
near consensus in the literature is that exposure to traumatic events makes individuals more risk 
averse. Whether it is tsunamis in Thailand (Cassar et al., 2011), floods and earthquakes in Indonesia 
(Cameron and Shah, 2015), war in Korea (Kim and Lee, 2014), the Great Depression (Malmendier 
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and Nagel, 2011), financial crises (Guiso et al., 2013), terrorist attacks (Sacco et al., 2003), or losing a 
child (Bucciol and Zarri, 2015) – experiences of personal trauma seem to be affecting the individuals’ 
preference functions and making them more risk averse. Three aspects of this body of research are 
particularly significant to note. First, these effects can be very long-lasting, possibly even permanent 
(Voors et al., 2012; Callen et al., 2014). Second, it seems it is the feeling of psychological distress that 
matters, not the actual experiences per se (Canetti-Nisim et al., 2009). And third, much more work is 
needed to parse out the importance of priming triggers in the whole story. There is a strong 
possibility that traumatic experiences can have decisive influence not on risk preferences, but on 
susceptibility to being primed to recall fear which in turn can lead to risk aversion (Callen et al., 
2014). 
 
The findings made in this area of research form the backbone of our principal proposition. We 
suggest that war-related trauma, likely through increased risk aversion, could lead to voters 
favouring proactive political forces which offer economic security through fiscally expansionist 
policies. Moreover, in post-war polities these individual-level effects are likely to be compounded by 
the fact that the repercussions of violence and destruction last long after the wars ‘officially’ end. In 
some cases, civilian suffering through sickness, disability, and war-related deaths even intensifies 
after the period of active warfare (Ghobarah, Huth and Russett, 2003). And in the environment of 
plummeting investment (Collier, 1999; Gupta et al., 2004), forgotten workforce skills (Collier and 
Duponchel, 2012), and lost and misplaced entrepreneurial talent (Sanders and Weitzel, 2013), post-
war reconstruction of the countries’ physical and economic capacities stutters for decades. Simply 
put, wars change societies. They are also likely to change voters’ expectations of what the 
government should do and their outlook on the social world around them (Strabac and Ringdal, 
2008; Hutchison, 2014). Wars also change the real needs of the population – needs that can most 
often be satisfied only by governmental action. In an environment of dwindling state capacity and 
high risk of conflict relapse, this places tremendous pressure on post-war policy makers, because 
progress toward sustainable peace depends on economic recovery (Collier et al., 2003; Flores and 
Nooruddin, 2009), and economic recovery to a great extent depends on governmental performance 
(Kang and Meernik, 2005). 
 
This argument leads us to two propositions. First, we hypothesise that on the individual level 
personal feelings of war trauma have an impact on voters’ opinions regarding the role of the 
government in the economy. More specifically, we hypothesise that individuals feeling war trauma 
are more likely to support fiscally proactive and redistributive government policies. A growing body 
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of work in economic psychology suggests that preferences are neither uniform nor immutable, and 
that significant traumatic experiences can change preferences in a substantive and long-lasting way. 
We want to establish if that is indeed the case when it comes to war trauma and individuals’ 
opinions regarding the appropriate economic role of the government. And second, we wish to 
extend this individual-level analysis and contribute to the ongoing debate about the fiscal 
conservatism/liberalism of voters by establishing whether spending has an impact on the re-election 
chances of incumbent municipal mayors and whether this impact is conditioned by the communities’ 
level of exposure to war violence. Our hypothesis is that the aforementioned individual-level 
dynamics do indeed translate into votes on the aggregate level, and that fiscally expansionist 
incumbents fare better electorally in areas harder hit by war violence. In other words, we 
hypothesise that post-war voters are fiscally liberal. 
 
Individual-level data and method: War trauma and governmental interventionism 
As stated earlier, the individual-level analysis presented in this study is based on data generated by 
the South-East European Social Survey Project (SEESSP) between November 2003 and March 2004. 
This project covered seven states of South-East Europe in a series of nationally representative 
samples with a combined total of nearly 22,000 respondents. The Croatian sample relevant for this 
study included 1,250 respondents from all 21 Croatian counties with several hundred variables 
covering a variety of demographic characteristics, attitudes, and opinions. The SEESSP project is 
particularly valuable for its data on respondents’ war trauma and experiences. For the purposes of 
our study, we created a seven-point scale capturing the incidence of various war-trauma sentiments 
among survey respondents. This is our principal explanatory variable of interest. We decided to 
focus on the sentiments of war-related trauma, rather than war experiences, guided by past 
research which has shown that it is indeed war-related psychological distress that matters in altering 
political preferences (Canetti-Nisim et al. 2009). Individuals were thus assigned values between 0 (no 
trauma) and 6 (high trauma) based on whether they were having: 1) thoughts or memories about a 
traumatic war-related event; 2) recurrent distressing dreams about a traumatic war-related event; 3) 
a recurrent sense of reliving past war trauma in the present; 4) persistent intense emotional or 
physical distress at exposure to war-trauma cues; 5) persistent avoidance of certain conversations, 
ideas, or activities that arouse painful war-related memories; or 6) persistent loss of memory for 
important parts of war trauma. The average value for all survey respondents on this war trauma 
scale was slightly higher than 1, with more than 38% of respondents reporting at least some war-
related trauma sentiments. 
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As the dependent variable in the individual-level section of analysis, we crafted a composite 
measure capturing to which extent respondents believe that the government should intervene in the 
running of the economy. We opted for a composite scale here because we believe it can help us 
improve reliability and validity compared to individual indicators. We therefore created the 
Government interventionism variable using four statements from the SEESSP survey which we 
believe perfectly capture what we are after: 1) “It is the responsibility of government to reduce the 
differences in income”; 2) “The government should provide a job for everyone who wants one”; 3) 
“The government should guarantee everyone a minimum standard of living”; and 4) “The state 
should intervene in the economy to reduce inequalities and protect the poor and weak”. Response 
categories ranged from strong disagreement (1) to strong agreement (5). As Table 1 demonstrates, 
principal component analysis suggests that the four items scale very well, with Cronbach’s Alpha at 
more than 0.8 and factor loadings ranging between 0.6 and 0.78. Following Dyrstad (2012), we 
created both a simple additive scale and a scale based on factor scores. Due to their exceptionally 
high correlation (0.999), we opted for the simpler scale because of its easier interpretation. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Our principal explanatory variable of interest War trauma is accompanied by a string of control 
variables listed in Table 2. Though they are all self-explanatory, three deserve additional attention: 
Veteran, Happiness, and Local optimism. We include veteran status as a control variable to test for 
possible differences between respondents with military and civilian backgrounds because of their 
markedly different experiences of war violence and post-war socialization. And we include 
Happiness and Local optimism as control variables to test for possible intervening impacts of the 
personal feeling of well-being, as well as of the positive or negative conditions in the local 
environment. Our variables are then used to estimate a number of OLS regression models. We test 
for possible problems of multicollinearity by computing variance inflation factors (VIF) for all 
independent variables and find none of them exceeding 2 (with the mean values of about 1.3). 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Aggregate-level data and method: Modelling incumbents’ electoral fortunes 
Finding reliable data for post-conflict polities, particularly on the sub-national level, is difficult. This 
was also true of Croatia, despite its solid public statistics when compared to other similar cases. Our 
primary units of analysis are Croatia’s 556 municipalities. The data we use were collected over a two-
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and-a-half-year period from four institutions of the Croatian government – National Electoral 
Commission (DIP), Croatian Employment Service (HZZ), Tax Administration (Porezna uprava), and the 
National Bureau of Statistics (DZS) – as well as from the 556 municipal authorities. The data cover a 
fifteen-year period (2002-2017) and include four cycles of local elections (2005, 2009, 2013, and 
2017). We complement this data with a set of variables covering the four pre-war years (1987-1990) 
and capturing the level of state-sector investments as well as municipal spending on education, 
health, and social services (Savezni zavod za statistiku, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992). We do that in an 
attempt to control for possible effects of pre-war patterns of local government fiscal activism. The 
definitions of the variables used in our analysis are presented in Table 3. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Several issues need to be noted here. First, our analysis is concerned only with municipalities where 
mayors remained in office throughout the whole term, which accounted for more than 90% of the 
cases. We opted for this choice because the inclusion of municipalities where there were mid-term 
changes in local governments due to coalition reshuffles or early elections could have biased the 
results. Second, Croatia’s local elections in 2005 were conducted under proportional representation 
(PR) rules, with mayors elected by local council majorities. Since 2009 mayors have been popularly 
elected under majoritarian rules. This means that our dependent variables Incumbent Vote for 2009, 
2013, and 2017 were the proportions of votes given to the incumbent mayor (or the candidate 
nominated by the incumbent mayor’s party if the mayor chose not to run) in the first round of 
elections; whereas in 2005 it was the proportion of votes given to the incumbent mayor’s 
party/coalition list. Third, our variable Spending was extracted from municipal budgets and 
represents the average annual values during the mayors’ whole terms in office. Since local elections 
in Croatia are always conducted in May, this in practice means that the spending figures in our 
analyses of the 2005, 2009, 2013, and 2017 elections include data for the periods 2002-2004, 2006-
2008, 2010-2012, and 2014-2016 respectively. Fourth, due to different reporting and accounting 
standards in the pre-war period, our pre-war variables are not perfectly comparable to the ones 
from the post-war period. Nevertheless, we believe they capture the fiscal activities of pre-war local 
governments rather well and enable us to factor in possible effects of pre-war patterns of spending 
and government investment. Finally, we should also note that as controls we include the variables 
Mayor alignment, Candidates, and the dummies for Croatia’s regions to capture possible spillover 
effect of national politics, supply of local electoral alternatives, and regional dynamics respectively. 
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A few words are also needed to explain our modelling of the legacy of war violence in Croatia’s 
municipalities. Obviously, war leaves a complex imprint on society with consequences ranging from 
direct physical damage and human loss to indirect costs in lower economic activity and misallocation 
of resources. Capturing the multitude of war effects is, therefore, nearly impossible – particularly 
when, as in Croatia’s case, there are still no reliable casualty or physical destruction figures on the 
municipal level. This is why we chose to create the variable War disabled using the 2001 census data 
which captured the number of disabled people whose cause of disability was the 1991-1995 war. 
Although far from ideal, the 2001 disability figures undeniably offer the best and most reliable 
method of capturing the effects of war violence on the population in the Croatian communities. Our 
Figure 1 presents the map of Croatia with the disability figures on the municipal level. As is obvious, 
the darker areas closely follow the war’s frontline which became frozen with the January 1992 
Sarajevo peace agreement which ushered in the arrival of UN forces. In our opinion, this is further 
evidence of the usefulness of this variable. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
As stated earlier, the aggregate-level empirical tasks are: 1) to contribute to the ongoing debate 
about the fiscal conservatism/liberalism of voters by establishing whether spending has an impact 
on the re-election chances of incumbent municipal mayors; and 2) to uncover whether the 
communities’ different experiences of war violence have an impact on voters’ calculus. In order to 
fulfil these empirical tasks, we estimate a series of models with Incumbent Vote as our dependent 
variable. The explanatory variables of our primary interest are Spending and its interaction with War 
disabled. Since Incumbent Vote is a proportional variable distributed on a unit interval (0,1), we 
apply the fractional logit model with a Bernoulli quasi-likelihood specification (Papke and 
Wooldridge, 1996) separately for each electoral cycle in our sample (2005, 2009, 2013, and 2017). 
We use a robust estimation of standard errors to control for heteroscedasticity, and – as in the 
individual-level portion of our analysis – test for possible multicollinearity by computing variance 
inflation factors (VIF) for all explanatory variables in our non-interactive models. Once again, we find 
their values well below the maximum recommended values, with the mean value of about 2.3.  
Considering the questions we are interested in, one would ideally employ some form of difference-
in-differences regression analysis in order to more adequately capture the effects of exposure to war 
violence on communities’ fiscal liberalism. Unfortunately, such a design is not possible due to the 
absence of democratic elections in Croatia’s pre-war political life. In other words, there is no real 
pre-war record of Croatian voters’ fiscal liberalism or conservatism. Croatian voters were able to 
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vote in relatively free multiparty local elections only once before the war: in 1990. Full results of 
those elections, however, have not been published. Even if they have, we believe analysing only one 
pre-war electoral cycle would not have been enough to pursue the diff-in-diff methodological 
strategy. Therefore, we suggest that the empirical approach we ultimately chose is the most 
appropriate, considering the limitations of the data and the historical context.  
 
Results and interpretations 
The results of our individual-level analysis are presented in Table 4. We estimate four models to 
parse out the effects of War trauma on Government interventionism independent of the 
respondents’ Veteran status. Our results clearly demonstrate that the sentiments of war trauma 
have an independent (i.e., not conditional), statistically significant, and substantively important 
effect on individuals’ opinion of the government’s role in the economy. Individuals experiencing 
feelings of war-related trauma – whether of military or civilian background – have a clear preference 
for a more interventionist role of the government in the economy. As we have argued, they turn to 
the government for economic security, possibly due to their greater general risk aversion. (Alesina 
and Giuliano, 2011) Here we should also note that, as a form of robustness check, we performed the 
same analysis on the four disaggregated components of Government interventionism and achieved 
substantively nearly identical results. War trauma has a positive and statistically significant effect on 
respondents’ views regarding the role of government in: 1) reducing income differences; 2) ensuring 
employment; 3) guaranteeing a minimum standard of living; and 4) protecting the poor and the 
weak. What is particularly notable, War trauma qualifies as one of top-three variables influencing 
respondents’ attitudes toward the government’s role in the economy, together with Religiosity and 
Settlement size. Its importance for our understanding of the post-war population’s attitudes toward 
possibly the most fundamental political economy question is therefore undeniable. 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
When it comes to our aggregate-level analysis, Table 5 presents the results of our models for all four 
electoral cycles with Incumbent vote as the dependent variable. Coefficients reported in the table 
are average marginal effects, instead of the usual log odds obtained via maximum likelihood 
estimation, to facilitate more useful and easier interpretation. Here we should also note that, as a 
robustness check, we performed the same analysis using OLS and had virtually identical results. The 
non-interactive models 1, 3, 5, and 7 have Spending as the principal explanatory variable of interest, 
and models 2, 4, 6, and 8 present the analysis with the variable Spending interacted with War 
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disabled. Two things are immediately apparent. First, models 1, 3, 5, and 7 convincingly demonstrate 
that spending has a consistently strong and positive effect on incumbent vote share. And second, 
models 2, 4, 6, and 8 show that this effect is clearly conditioned by the municipalities’ exposure to 
war violence. 
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
If we look at the results of our analysis in the non-interactive models, in 2005 an increase in 
Spending by one standard deviation (0.69) resulted in an increase of incumbent vote share of 3.4 
percentage points. In 2009, a one standard deviation increase (0.68) in Spending resulted in an 
increase of incumbent vote share of 4.8 percentage points. In 2013 the effect was a 3.7 percentage 
point increase, while in 2017 the effect was 2.0 percentage point increase of incumbent vote share 
following a one standard deviation increase in spending (0.62 in 2013, 0.58 in 2017). The conclusion 
is therefore clear. Croatian voters overall are fiscally liberal, just like the voters in Argentina, Brazil, 
Colombia, Portugal, and Russia (Brender, 2003; Veiga and Veiga, 2007; Sakurai and Menezes-Filho, 
2008; Drazen and Eslava, 2010; Jones, Meloni and Tommasi, 2012). This may be because of the 
structure of Croatia’s fiscal system in which municipal governments are largely dependent on the 
national government’s goodwill for their budgets, but answering that question definitively is beyond 
the scope of this paper. We present graphically the results concerning the impact of Spending on 
Incumbent vote in Figure 2 with the two top graphs showing the results for the 2005 and 2009 
elections, and the bottom two graphs showing the results for the 2013 and 2017 elections. 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
What is equally important, however, is that our interactive models 2, 4, 6, and 8 show that there are 
differences among Croatian municipalities based on the level of exposure to war violence. Voters in 
areas which experienced greater levels of war violence seem to exhibit different policy preferences 
when compared to their compatriots living in areas which were lucky enough to avoid the heaviest 
fighting. In each one of the four elections, the interactive term Spending x War disabled has a 
positive and statistically significant effect on Incumbent vote. Simply put, voters in areas that were 
more exposed to war violence are more fiscally liberal. They tend to reward incumbents for 
increased spending at greater rates than their compatriots who live in areas which were not as 
heavily affected by war violence. 
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In interpreting our results here, we will use the provisions of Croatia’s Reconstruction Act of 1996 
(Zastupnički dom, 1996), which accorded the status of reconstruction areas to 163 municipalities 
which had been directly exposed to combat operations and had significant war damages. In those 
163 municipalities, the average value of War disabled was 16.2, whereas in the remaining 
municipalities it was 5.3. Based on those figures, and based on standard deviation figures of 
Spending for the 2005, 2009, 2013, and 2017 elections (0.69, 0.68, 0.62, and 0.58 respectively), we 
can say that in 2005 a one standard deviation increase in Spending brought 3.0 percentage points to 
the incumbent in an average municipality which was not directly exposed to combat versus 5.2 
percentage points in an average municipality which was directly exposed to combat. In 2009, those 
figures were 4.5 versus 6.7 percentage points, in 2013 they were 3.4 versus 6.8 percentage points, 
and in 2017 they were 1.5 versus 3.4 percentage points. Voters in war affected areas reward 
incumbents for increased spending at disproportionately higher rates than do voters in areas which 
were not directly affected by war. This discrepancy shows little sign of abating over time. On the 
contrary, it was as strong and substantively nearly as large in 2017 (i.e. 22 years after the end of war 
operations) as in 2005. We present our findings regarding the marginal effects of Spending on 
Incumbent vote conditional on War disabled in graphic form in Figure 3. The x-axis in all four graphs 
is War disabled. The top two graphs present the results of analysis for the 2005 and 2009 elections, 
and the bottom two graphs for the 2013 and 2017 elections. The trend is clear. The more exposed to 
war violence a community was – the more fiscally liberal were its voters. 
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
This finding that conditions fiscal imprudence to exposure to war violence could obviously be biased. 
It is possible that war-affected areas were fiscally liberal even before the war, which could imply that 
their voters’ desire for greater government spending in the post-war period would not be 
conditioned on war but simply a reflection of their pre-existing pattern of economic interaction with 
the (then socialist) government. As stated above, however, the problem with testing this directly is 
that before the war Croatia was governed by one-party rule and held relatively free and fair local 
elections only once. Detailed electoral results for those local elections have not been published, 
making comparisons in pre-war and post-war voting outcomes, unfortunately, impossible.  
 
What is possible, however, is to include variables of pre-war municipal spending and pre-war levels 
of state/social sector investments in order to examine whether pre-war patterns of local 
government fiscal activity had any long-lasting impact on the communities’ electoral preferences. If 
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communities have been “trained” to depend on local government spending because of their relative 
underdevelopment or because of any other reason rooted in the local pre-war socioeconomic 
context, then we should notice some effect between our two pre-war variables and post-war 
electoral outcomes that reward incumbents which redistribute more. However, as the values in 
Table 5 show, there is no such effect present in any of the electoral years. Here we should note that 
we also performed our analyses using a number of variations of the two variables (not logged, 
extended to the whole 1980s, etc.), as well as including their interactions with our principal post-war 
variables of interest – and we still found no effect on incumbent vote share in any election. We also 
performed the same analyses using a battery of variables capturing the pre-war level of economic 
development – from municipal unemployment to the proportion of the local population that is 
economically active – and the results were virtually unchanged. Although these robustness tests do 
not solve our endogeneity problem, they do offer a good indication that pre-war patterns of local 
government economic activity did not impact voter choices after the war. We believe we can, 
therefore, safely conclude that exposure to war violence was clearly an important factor in 
rendering a community more fiscally liberal.  
 
Finally, it should be mentioned that some of our findings when it comes to control variables are also 
noteworthy, particularly our two measures capturing the context of political competition. As could 
have been expected, and in line with previous research (e.g. Krebs, 1998), the clearest effect on 
incumbent vote share is exhibited by the variable Candidates which measures the number of 
electoral competitors vying for the mayoral post. Thus each additional candidate on average reduces 
support for the incumbent between 4.0 and 7.9 percentage points. Moreover, and in line with 
previous findings (Gélineau and Bélanger, 2004; Sakurai and Menezes-Filho, 2008) the effect of 
incumbent mayors’ political alignment with the national government seems to depend on the 
performance of the national economy. In 2005, when Croatia’s economy was experiencing a healthy 
GDP growth of 4.2 percent, political alignment of mayors with the national government brought 
them 5.3 percentage points at the polls. In 2013, on the other hand, when Croatia’s GDP 
experienced negative growth of -0.9 percent, political alignment of mayors with the national 
government decreased their vote share by four percentage points. Generally speaking, incumbents 
seem to do worse in less populous municipalities with better educated voters, higher rates of 
unemployment, and when confronted by a higher number of challengers. 
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Conclusions 
In this study we primarily wanted to answer one question: is there something fundamentally 
different in the way post-war voters evaluate political incumbents? We focused our attention on 
what we consider the most fundamental political issue, namely the role of the government in the 
running of the economy. Simply put, we wanted to determine if war makes people more fiscally 
conservative or liberal. Guided by the growing body of work which suggests that traumatic 
experiences can make individuals more risk averse, we theorised that voters’ war-related sentiments 
of trauma made them more inclined to support a proactive role of government in the economy. We 
then took that individual-level supposition further and suggested that fiscally expansionist 
incumbents would do better in areas more affected by war violence, exactly because of the 
preference of war-affected voters for government-provided economic security. The results of our 
analysis are clear. Voters experiencing war-related trauma do indeed have a stronger preference for 
the government’s interventionism in the economy. And incumbents who spend more do indeed fare 
better in areas more affected by war violence. 
  
The most obvious implication of our study with regards to the relationship of the legacy of war and 
voters’ calculus is that there seems to be yet another way in which war affects societies after the 
actual violence has ended: it makes the affected populations (more) fiscally liberal. At face value, 
even without our individual-level findings regarding the effect of war trauma on attitudes toward 
governments’ economic interventionism, this would seem natural. Voters living in communities 
which have experienced violence and destruction have greater needs and expectations from their 
governments. They want their roads and buildings to be fixed and their firms and economic 
enterprises to get back in business, so that their lives can return to normalcy as soon as possible. 
Policy makers who use the public purse to help make that happen get rewarded at the polls. Our 
findings regarding the impact of war-related trauma, however, suggest the reasons for this dynamic 
are even deeper and lay in voters’ altered political preferences. Voters experiencing war-related 
trauma turn to the government for economic security and thus turn to political leaders to provide 
that security. These are important findings for our understanding of post-war political competition 
and consequently of the political economy of post-war reconstruction. 
 
What is equally important to note is that these trends persist even nearly two decades after the war 
has ended. This dynamic can be explained in one of two possible ways: either 1) the challenges of 
post-war reconstruction and recovery – both personal and social – last longer than expected; or 2) 
the pattern of electoral reward and punishment between voters and political office-holders is 
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altered in a long-lasting manner. Determining which combination of these two explanations comes 
closest to the truth is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is a question that deserves our utmost 
attention. Post-war societies usually have weak institutions and even weaker safeguards against 
corruption and clientelism. A system which electorally rewards incumbents for fiscal largesse is 
particularly prone to both phenomena. In other words, the very real needs of post-war populations 
and their understandable hopes and demands from policy makers for government activism in the 
process of reconstruction and economic recovery could also set them down the path of public sector 
dependency and political populism for years to come after the violence ends. Developing 
institutional mechanisms which would help prevent such developments could be one of the most 
challenging aspects of post-war reconstruction. 
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Table 1. Factor analysis of attitudes toward the role of government in the economy 
 
 Items Factor loadings 
(1) It is the responsibility of government to reduce the differences in income. 0.602 
(2) The government should provide a job for everyone who wants one. 0.778 
(3) The government should guarantee everyone a minimum standard of living. 0.759 
(4) The state should intervene in the economy to reduce inequalities and protect the 
poor and weak. 
0.706 
 Eigenvalue 2.043 
 Cronbach’s Alpha 0.809 
 Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy (KMO) 0.752 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Definition of individual-level variables 
 
Variable Definition 
Government interventionism Composite measure capturing support for government’s economic interventionism 
War trauma Self-reported feelings of war trauma, 0-6 scale (0=no war trauma). 
Veteran Dummy variable capturing war veteran status (1=veteran). 
Gender = 1 male; = 0 female. 
Age Years of age. 
Married = 1 married; =0 otherwise. 
Education Years of education. 
Unemployment =1 if unemployed; =0 otherwise. 
Income Scale 1-16, =1 if no income, and each new group goes up by 1,000 Croatian kunas. 
Religiosity Scale 0-10 where 10=very religious. 
Croat =1 if ethnically Croat; =0 otherwise. 
Settlement size =1 if up to 2,000; =2 if 2,000-10,000; =3 if 10,000-100,000; =4 if more than 100,000 
inhabitants. 
Happiness Scale 0-10 where 10=extremely happy. 
Local optimism Agreement with statement “This city/community has a very difficult situation, and 
I am not optimistic.” Scale 1-5, where 1=strongly agree and 5=strongly disagree. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Definition of municipality-level variables 
 
Variable Definition 
Incumbent vote Proportion of votes for the incumbent mayor (2009, 2013, 2017) or his/her list (2005) 
Spending Average annual total expenditures per capita during the mayor’s term in office 
(deflated to 2010 levels), natural logged 
War disabled Number of disabled per ‘000 whose cause of disability was the 1991-1995 war for 
independence, based on 2001 census 
Mayor alignment = 1 when mayor from the same party as the national government; = 0 otherwise 
Candidates Number of candidates for mayor (2009, 2013, 2017) or electoral lists (2005) 
Unemployment Average monthly unemployment rate in electoral year 
Income Income per capita in electoral year (deflated to 2010 levels), natural logged 
Education Average years of education for population older than 15 years of age 
Agriculture Proportion of population with primary source of income from agriculture 
Croats Proportion of population ethnically Croat 
Population Population, natural logged 
Pre-war investment Average annual social/state sector investment per capita in the period 1987-1990 
(deflated to 1980 levels), natural logged 
Pre-war spending Average annual municipal spending on health, education, and social services per 
capita in the period 1987-1990 (deflated to 1980 levels), natural logged 
Dalmatia = 1 if municipality in Dalmatia (n=131); = 0 otherwise 
Slavonia = 1 if municipality in Slavonia (n=127); = 0 otherwise 
Istria = 1 if municipality in Istria (n=47); = 0 otherwise 
 
 
 
Table 4. Determinants of attitudes toward the role of government in the economy 
 
 1 2 3 4 
War trauma 0.039*** 
(0.011) 
 0.032*** 
(0.012) 
0.027* 
(0.014) 
Veteran  0.167** 
(0.068) 
0.130* 
(0.072) 
0.092 
(0.096) 
War trauma X Veteran    0.022 
(0.028) 
Gender -0.049 
(0.042) 
-0.086* 
(0.045) 
-0.085* 
(0.045) 
-0.086* 
(0.045) 
Age 0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
Married -0.009 
(0.041) 
-0.011 
(0.041) 
-0.015 
(0.041) 
-0.017 
(0.041) 
Education -0.005 
(0.006) 
-0.007 
(0.006) 
-0.006 
(0.006) 
-0.006 
(0.006) 
Unemployment -0.053 
(0.064) 
-0.048 
(0.065) 
-0.050 
(0.066) 
-0.045 
(0.065) 
Income -0.005 
(0.010) 
-0.006 
(0.010) 
-0.008 
(0.010) 
-0.008 
(0.010) 
Religiosity 0.031*** 
(0.008) 
0.033*** 
(0.008) 
0.030*** 
(0.008) 
0.030*** 
(0.008) 
Croat 0.019 
(0.077) 
-0.012 
(0.078) 
0.015 
(0.078) 
0.016 
(0.078) 
Settlement size -0.072*** 
(0.018) 
-0.059*** 
(0.018) 
-0.066*** 
(0.018) 
-0.066*** 
(0.018) 
Happiness 0.001 
(0.010) 
-0.001 
(0.010) 
0.001 
(0.010) 
0.001 
(0.010) 
Local optimism -0.011 
(0.019) 
-0.013 
(0.019) 
-0.008 
(0.019) 
-0.007 
(0.019) 
Constant 4.229*** 
(0.163) 
4.269*** 
(0.165) 
4.230*** 
(0.164) 
4.220*** 
(0.163) 
Observations 918 912 909 909 
R-squared 0.076 0.071 0.079 0.080 
***p<0.01. **p<0.05. *p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses; OLS used throughout. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Effects on Incumbent vote in 2005, 2009, 2013, and 2017 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; fractional logit used throughout. 
 
 
 2005 2009 2013 2017 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Spending 0.049*** 
(0.012) 
0.027* 
(0.016) 
0.071*** 
(0.014) 
0.050*** 
(0.018) 
0.060*** 
(0.013) 
0.029* 
(0.016) 
0.034*** 
(0.013) 
0.010 
(0.017) 
War disabled 0.0008 
(0.0007) 
-0.023** 
(0.009) 
-0.0003 
(0.0009) 
-0.025* 
(0.014) 
-0.0001 
(0.0009) 
-0.039*** 
(0.011) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.028** 
(0.014) 
War disabled * Spending  
 
0.003** 
(0.001) 
 
 
0.003* 
(0.002) 
 
 
0.005*** 
(0.001) 
 0.003** 
(0.002) 
Mayor alignment 0.054*** 
(0.013) 
0.053*** 
(0.013) 
0.023* 
(0.014) 
0.024* 
(0.014) 
-0.041*** 
(0.015) 
-0.040*** 
(0.015) 
0.032*** 
(0.012) 
0.030*** 
(0.012) 
Candidates -0.040*** 
(0.003) 
-0.040*** 
(0.003) 
-0.065*** 
(0.005) 
-0.064*** 
(0.004) 
-0.072*** 
(0.005) 
-0.071*** 
(0.005) 
-0.079*** 
(0.005) 
-0.079*** 
(0.005) 
Unemployment -0.204** 
(0.098) 
-0.170* 
(0.099) 
-0.329*** 
(0.119) 
-0.291** 
(0.120) 
-0.025 
(0.102) 
0.018 
(0.102) 
0.004 
(0.105) 
0.035 
(0.104) 
Income -0.042 
(0.045) 
-0.038 
(0.045) 
-0.140*** 
(0.048) 
-0.136*** 
(0.047) 
-0.075* 
(0.043) 
-0.080* 
(0.042) 
0.054 
(0.046) 
0.045 
(0.046) 
Education -0.032*** 
(0.009) 
-0.029*** 
(0.009) 
-0.021* 
(0.011) 
-0.018 
(0.011) 
-0.001 
(0.011) 
0.006 
(0.011) 
-0.033*** 
(0.012) 
-0.029** 
(0.012) 
Agriculture -0.022 
(0.080) 
-0.032 
(0.080) 
-0.116* 
(0.072) 
-0.126* 
(0.071) 
-0.006 
(0.067) 
-0.021 
(0.067) 
-0.002 
(0.064) 
-0.022 
(0.065) 
Croats -0.026 
(0.051) 
-0.014 
(0.051) 
-0.017 
(0.047) 
-0.009 
(0.046) 
0.031 
(0.045) 
0.042 
(0.044) 
-0.074 
(0.054) 
-0.064 
(0.053) 
Population 0.057*** 
(0.008) 
0.055*** 
(0.008) 
0.021** 
(0.009) 
0.018* 
(0.009) 
0.028*** 
(0.008) 
0.022*** 
(0.008) 
0.034*** 
(0.008) 
0.032*** 
(0.008) 
Pre-war investment 0.0007 
(0.012) 
0.002 
(0.012) 
-0.005 
(0.014) 
-0.005 
(0.014) 
-0.002 
(0.011) 
-0.003 
(0.011) 
0.005 
(0.012) 
0.006 
(0.012) 
Pre-war spending 0.010 
(0.015) 
0.013 
(0.015) 
0.019 
(0.015) 
0.022 
(0.015) 
-0.006 
(0.014) 
-0.005 
(0.014) 
-0.002 
(0.015) 
-0.0007 
(0.014) 
Dalmatia 0.001 
(0.014) 
-0.0004 
(0.014) 
0.002 
(0.017) 
0.0008 
(0.018) 
0.002 
(0.016) 
-0.004 
(0.016) 
-0.014 
(0.018) 
-0.015 
(0.017) 
Istria 0.016 
(0.025) 
0.029 
(0.026) 
-0.045 
(0.041) 
-0.034 
(0.041) 
0.043 
(0.031) 
0.062** 
(0.031) 
-0.001 
(0.028) 
0.011 
(0.029) 
Slavonia 0.019 
(0.016) 
0.029* 
(0.016) 
0.043*** 
(0.016) 
0.051*** 
(0.016) 
0.020 
(0.017) 
0.030* 
(0.017) 
0.010 
(0.018) 
0.016 
(0.018) 
N 512 512 491 491 533 533 530 530 
Log pseudolikelihood -227.0 -226.9 -223.1 -223.0 -241.7 -241.5 -237.3 -237.1 
R2 0.366 0.372 0.398 0.402 0.425 0.434 0.446 0.451 
Figure 1. War disabled by municipality 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Predicted values of Incumbent vote based on Spending. 
 
 
Figure 3. Marginal effects of Spending on Incumbent vote. 
 
